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We introdue and dene the Censoring Firewall Problem (CFP) where two ol-
luders attempt to transmit banned messages through a rewall. We analyze the problem
with the SVO logi to prove onditions neessary for the olluders to sueed.
This is a novel appliation of SVO to a problem for whih it was not originally
designed. Our analysis illustrates shortomings of SVO to our approah. Our primary
ontribution is the onept of a omputable lter funtion whih allows us to adapt
SVO to the CFP.
Our ontribution shows how SVO (a formal view) when applied to the CFP
redues to a problem of omputability, highlighting the interfae between the formal
method and omputational soundness perspetives.
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Chapter 1
Introdution
We study ontent-based ensorship by a rewall using the SVO logi
1
. Our
primary ontribution is the onept of a omputable lter funtion, whih allows us to
adapt SVO to apply to our problem denition. Using this approah, we show that it
is possible for olluders to transmit banned messages if they agree on an obfusation
transformation based on the rewall's ltering poliy.
In this introdutory hapter we motivate and dene the Censoring Firewall Prob-
lem (CFP). In Chapter 2 we rmly embed our analysis in a larger ontext of possible
approahes to larify our assumptions and the diretion further researh should take.
Chapter 3 is our spei analysis with the SVO authentiation logi, whih begins with
an illustrative analysis to motivate our main ontribution. Our main ontribution, the
notion of a omputable lter funtion whih denes the rewall poliy, is presented in
Setion 3.2.1. We proeed to rene the illustrative analysis using the onepts we de-
velop. Chapter 4 presents avenues for future researh, inluding gaps in our approah,
broadening the CFP denition, extending SVO by integrating features from other logis,
and analyzing further onstraints on the lter funtion. We onlude in Chapter 5.
1
The SVO logi is presented in [3℄ and [2℄, of whih we mostly rely on the latter. The aronym is
based on the authors' names, Syverson and van Oorshot.
31.1 Motivation
Traditionally rewalls are seen as improving the seurity of a group of omputers
against attaks from the \outside". In this view, the rewall is seen to represent the
interests of a given proteted host. An outside attaker wishes to send messages to
the proteted host whih may ompromise its seurity. The intended reipient and the
rewall share the goal of bloking harmful messages.
Another senario has beome ommon in omputer networks as the goals and
relationships between human users and organizations grows more varied. The dening
harateristi of this senario is that the message reipient has goals in onit with
the ensor. Beause of this, the reipient may ollude with the sender to irumvent the
message bloking.
We use the term \ensorship" to represent this onit of goals. We stress our use
of this term does not imply some ommon, presriptive onnotations of the term (namely
that \ensorship is bad"). For instane, the reipient may be a bak-door running on
a mahine and upon reeipt of the message, that host will initiate an internal network
attak.
1.1.1 Errors in Poliy
We also distinguish between goals, poliies, and behavior. Goals are the objet of
human desires. Poliies are omputer-based implementations whih attempt to ahieve
ertain goals. Behavior is the atual result of a omputer exeuting a spei poliy in
a partiular irumstane.
One result of this researh is to emphasize that although a given poliy may
appear to ahieve a ertain goal, it often does not. This is onsistently an issue in
seurity researh, and serves as one of our primary motivations.
41.1.2 Extending Protool Analysis
Tehniques have developed for analyzing protools whih emphasize what parti-
ipants an learn from messages, and how messages reeived inuene knowledge and
behavior. This is espeially true in ryptography whih assumes partiipants with on-
iting goals.
The problem we wish to address is rooted in the transmission and knowledge of
messages in the ontext of oniting goals. However, the senarios whih interest us
are suÆiently dierent from those historially onsidered by ryptographi analyses to
require further researh.
1.2 Problem Denition
Here we set out our assumptions and some denitions of the problem we wish to
address. Spei denitions are given in Setion 3.2.1 within the ontext of the analysis.
1.2.1 Network Model
1.2.1.1 Topology.
The network onsists of prinipals related by a onnetion topology whih on-
strains whih prinipals may ommuniate diretly. For our purposes, we onsider a
minimal ase with only three prinipals, A, B, and C. The olluders, A and B, are eah
onneted only to the ensor, C. We use the onvention that A is the message sender,
and B the intended reipient.
This preludes analysis of route-based rewall poliies, whih is an important area
of further researh.
51.2.1.2 Messages.
All messages sent or reeived are either requests for forwarding (alled requests for
short) or the result of forwarding (forwards for short). A request ontains a destination
and a body. A forward ontains only a body.
Eah message belongs to a language speied in the SVO logi. We disuss this
restrition more in Setion 3.1.
1.2.2 Firewall Constraints
We limit the apabilities of the rewall in order to onstrain the sope to what
we onsider the fundamentals of this problem. Changing any of these limitations would
reveal new aspets of the ensoring rewall problem, and we address eah possible hange
in Setion 4.3.
This set of apabilities is largely what dierentiates this problem from typial
senarios addressed by ryptographi protool logis, suh as SVO. Typially, an entity
alled the adversary seeks to ompromise some seurity goal aording to some set
of apabilities. Also, the adversary employs those apabilities arbitrarily to ahieve
ompromise.
In our approah the term \the adversary" is misleading for several reasons. Eah
partiipant views any other partiipant with oniting goals as an adversary, so there
is no single objetive adversary. Furthermore, the rewall follows a set, known poliy,
and does not arbitrarily employ its apabilities. Finally, although the olluders do
arbitrarily employ their apabilities, they do not have perfet knowledge sharing and
at independently
2
.
2
Cryptographi protool logis disussed in Setion 2.1.2 onsider multiple adversaries whih may
ollude, in whih ase we might onsider our olluders to be adversaries of this type.
61.2.2.1 Passive Bloking.
The rewall either forwards or bloks eah reeived message one. The only
messages it sends are forwards. All forwards are unmodied re-transmissions of a single
request body. Every request triggers either a single forward or no ation (when the
request is bloked). By speifying the riterion for bloking messages, together with
this onstraint, we ompletely speify the rewall poliy.
We all this passive beause the rewall does not employ any other ative attaks
suh as modifying request bodies before forwarding, initiating any messages aside from
forwards, replaying any messages, et. It diers somewhat from the onept of passive
eavesdropper beause the rewall interepts messages and bloks them aording to a
set poliy.
1.2.2.2 Message Independene.
Eah message is onsidered individually, without regard to previously seen mes-
sages. We believe this to be ommon in pratie.
1.2.2.3 Content-Based.
Criteria for ltering a message depends only on the body, not on its soure or
destination. We refer to this as ontent-based bloking as opposed to route-based blok-
ing. We onsider these to be orthogonal onsiderations for bloking riteria, and thus
our analysis ould be omplemented by onsidering route-based bloking separately.
Content-based rewalls are ommon in the wild, although perhaps less ommon than
route-only rewalls.
71.2.3 Dening Censorship
Given the network model and rewall apabilities above, we now build up to a
onise denition of ensorship
3
:
Any message, M , belongs to a language, M
T
, of primitive terms, T . The prim-
itive terms are a set of onstant terms and the language is the losure of the primitive
terms over ertain operations
4
.
The set of banned messages, B, is a subset of the language: B M
T
. Likewise the
allowed messages, A, omplements the banned messages: A[B =M
T
and A\B = ;.
Using these terms we an dene ensorship aording to this poliy: If C reeives
request M 2 A, then C sends the orresponding forward, else the request M 2 B and
C does nothing.
3
Whenever our denition oinides with one in the SVO logi in [2℄, we use the same symbols for
onsisteny.
4
The spei primitives (suh as keys and nones) and onstrution operations (suh as onatenation
and enryption) are disussed more thoroughly in Setion 3.1.2.
Chapter 2
Bakground
In this Chapter, we embed the SVO logi in the larger ontext of ryptographi
protool analysis tehniques. We also briey introdue SVO in detail, surveying those
parts neessary in understanding our analysis.
The rst setion is an overview of formal methods used in ryptographi protool
analysis. This is followed by an introdution to belief logis and SVO in partiular. The
last setion reviews two distint approahes to ryptographi protool analysis and work
on relating them. This is relevant to our work whih also relates these two perspetives.
2.1 Disrete Formal Methods
We summarize a variety of formal methods reently developed, relating them to
our approah. This overview follows losely that of Meadows in [6℄. These disrete
methods view operations (suh as enryption or message transmission) as atomi and
deterministi. This ontrasts with omputational approahes whih onsider probabilis-
ti ryptanalyti attaks.
2.1.1 Foundations
In [7℄, Dolev and Yao present models for analyzing protool seurity. These
models rest on assumptions whih have beome standard in formal methods. For the
most part, we adhere to the same assumptions, but with important dierenes whih
9we make expliit.
2.1.1.1 Perfet Publi Key System.
The one-way (asymmetri) enryption funtions are onsidered unbreakable, IE:
invulnerable to omputational attaks. We do not rely on this assumption beause our
results assume no ryptanalyti attaker.
2.1.1.2 Solved PKI.
The authors set out two assumptions whih we group, namely that everyone
knows all publi keys, and that eah prinipal has a private key known only to it. As
we disuss below, suessor analysis tehniques allow more exibility in these kinds of
assumptions to over a greater range of protools. In other words, these assumptions
an be expressed as expliit premises in our analysis and will be onsidered there.
2.1.1.3 Uniform Protool.
The protools in question apply to any set of prinipals who agree to employ
it, by taking on requisite roles. That is, the protools are not spei to individual
prinipals. This is a standard assumption we also adopt. We prefer to rephrase it by
saying that all protool dependenies on the uniqueness of a partiipant are either due
to topology or represented within the protool as parameters (for example by possession
of serets).
2.1.1.4 Partiipants and Intruder Capabilities.
Perhaps the most inuential aspet of [7℄ is the power attributed to the intruder
(aka saboteur). Dolev and Yao distinguish between passive versus ative eavesdroppers.
They argue that the latter represent an important and (at the time) under-represented
problem in seurity. They set out to model ommuniations between only two parti-
10
ipants, but whih may be tampered with atively by an intruder. The intruder an
interept any message (possibly bloking propagation), an initiate the protool as a
partiipant, and an modify any message en route.
In addressing the CFP, we fous on a dierent aspet of ommuniation, ne-
gleting any intruder. The rewall is limited by the rewall onstraints given in Setion
1.2.2, and the olluders behavior is dened by those onstraints.
As we disuss below the suessors of Dolev and Yao relax the assumptions of the
intruder apabilities in order to have more exibility in modeling it. Dolev and Yaos'
ative versus passive distintion an be thought of as two extremes in a spae of possible
intruder apabilities. In this sense, we may view the rewall as a very limited intruder.
2.1.2 Overview of Formal Approahes
Meadows gives an overview of three lasses of approah to protool analysis, whih
we briey summarize. Eah of these approahes has suessfully exposed previously
unnotied attaks.
State Exploration Tehniques. This lass of approah uses an automated
tool to explore a state spae speied by the analyst. Commonly speiations are based
on a Dolev-Yao model. Partiular states are dened as seurity violations, then the
automated tool attempts to reah suh attak states. If the tool does indeed reah suh
a state, it an provide the sequene of state transitions leading to that state. Indutive
theorem proving omplements suh analyses, for example by proving the searh spae
for the automated tool is too large for attaks to be disovered in omputable time.
Type Cheking. Meadows refers to this as \perhaps the newest approah" in
the eld, whih assigns types to messages and hannels, and represents seurity aws
as type violations. Type heking an be automated like state exploration, but ertain
lasses of innite systems an also be handled.
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Belief Logis. A third lass of analysis methods is belief logi, whih inludes
the SVO logi. These methods represent relationships between prinipals, data, and
their beliefs about that data as modal operators in a formal logi. Inferene rules are
used to prove seurity properties, and a lak of proof may indiate a seurity aw.
The seminal work in this eld is the BAN logi
1
given in [8℄, whih inspired a
variety of desendant logis, eah addressing dierent onerns. In [1℄, Syverson gives
an overview of the drawbaks of BAN, and reviews several suessors eah addressing
dierent aws of BAN. Syverson and van Oorshot developed the SVO logi to unify
the advantages of these suessors. We review SVO in the next setion.
Another logi of note is proposed in [4℄, we refer to as GS.
2
GS addresses many of
the drawbaks we expose in SVO, but unfortunately it does not aommodate arbitrary
omputable funtions, whih are essential for our results. We disuss this more fully in
Setion 4.4.
2.1.3 Review of SVO
We now review the most relevant parts of SVO for our analysis.
2.1.3.1 The Message Language.
The language of messages in SVO, M
T
, was presented in Setion 1.2.3. Speif-
ially it is the losure of a set of primitive terms, T , and formulae, over all funtions
F (X
1
; : : : ;X
n
). Suh funtions inlude onatenation: F (X;Y ) = (X;Y ), and enryp-
tion: F (M;k) = fMg
k
.
1
The aronym \BAN" omes from the authors, Burrows, Abadi, and Needham. This onvention
has stuk in the eld, with eah logi named after the authors.
2
This follows the onvention in naming these logis.
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2.1.3.2 Inferene Rules.
Modus Ponens and Neessitation are the only two inferene rules in SVO. If '
and  represent any formulae, then we have these denitions:
Modus Ponens: From '   and ' infer  
Neessitation: If ' follows from the axioms, infer P believes '
2.1.3.3 Axioms.
Here we desribe those SVO axioms (and axiom shemata) used in our derivations.
Note, these axiom labels ome from [2℄, whih dier from an earlier version of SVO given
in [3℄.
The following axiom ensures that P believes everything whih logially follows
from its beliefs. Let ' and  be any formulae, then:
Ax1. P believes ' ^ P believes ('   )  P believes  
If P reeives an enrypted message and has aess to the key, then P reeives the
plaintext:
Ax8. (P reeived fXg
k
^ P sees
~
K)  P reeived X
Anything reeived is seen:
Ax10. P reeived X  P sees X
P an see any funtion of anything it sees:
Ax12. (P sees X
1
^ : : : ^ P sees X
n
)  (P sees F (X
1
; : : : ;X
n
))
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2.2 Computational Versus Formal Perspetives
Aording to Abadi and Rogaway in [5℄ there are two views of ryptography that
have developed, treating the subjet dierently. They present an equivalene between
denitions of seurity given from eah perspetive as a rst step at bridging the gap.
We give a brief omparison here, and justify why we hoose a formal method approah.
2.2.0.4 Computational View.
In the omputational view, ryptographi operations are onsidered algorithms
operating on strings of bits. Seurity properties are dened taking probability and
omputational ost into aount.
2.2.0.5 Formal View.
This view represents ryptographi operations symbolially in a formal language.
The relevant properties of a ryptographi operation are assumed as part of the formal
semantis. Given that those properties hold, formal methods allow analysis of more
omplex systems built on top of suh primitives.
Chapter 3
Analysis
In this setion we present two ontrastive analyses of the CFP using the SVO
logi. The rst analysis follows a typial SVO proedure. It is illustrative of drawbaks
to this typial approah. The seond analysis presents a rened approah whih more
aurately desribes the CFP. Between these analyses, we present key onepts neessary
for the rened analysis. The essential onept is the main ontribution of our work, the
omputable lter poliy.
3.1 Illustrative Analysis
This illustrative analysis uses SVO to model a spei instane of the CFP in
whih the olluders obfusate a banned message with enryption. It proeeds in the
manner typial of examples given in [2℄. Along the way we highlight shortomings of
this approah.
3.1.1 Goals
The olluders wish to send a banned message, M 2 B. We dene expressions
whih represent the olluders ahieving their goal. If we an derive these goal expressions
from some starting assumptions, then those assumptions are suÆient for the olluders
to realize their goal. If not, the ensor's goal is realized.
For simpliity, we onsider A and B to have the same two goals: B must reeive
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the banned message and B must properly interpret this as the ase. The orresponding
SVO expressions are:
G1. B sees M
G2. B believes B sees M
The rewall should be ontent if either of these annot be ahieved. If B reeives
the message but annot realize this fat (IE: G1 but not G2), it annot at on the
ontents. On the other hand, if B believes it has reeived the message when it has not,
it will at mistakenly on the ontents.
Notie that these goals don't inlude any statement about A believing B has
reeived the message. This means A annot know if the goal is reahed.
3.1.2 Protool
We present a minimalist protool speiation, whih leaves out routing informa-
tion
1
and only ontains the main ontent. We follow the speiation with disussion
of two shortomings of SVO protool speiations.
M1. A! C : fMg
k
M2. C ! B : fMg
k
3.1.2.1 Invariable Message Constraint.
The speiation for M1 is misleading, beause it implies the protool is \a lient
sends an enrypted message to the rewall". We would rather express \a lient sends
an arbitrary message in a given language to the rewall". We annot speify a protool
with arbitrary messages, only messages tting a presribed form.
1
Reall that our network topology implies a single route. A sends a request by onvention, and B
is the only possible destination.
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3.1.2.2 Non-branhing Protool Constraint.
SVO does not handle branhing protools in whih dierent messages may be
sent depending on previous messages. The CFP exemplies suh a branh: Depending
on the request, either a forward is sent, or nothing is sent. We must speify only one of
these ases, whih plaes onstraints on the request.
In this analysis we assume the rewall forwards the message. We refer to this as
the forwarding assumption. The rewall only forwards messages in the allowed set, so
it follows that fMg
k
2 A.
3.1.3 Initial State
These premises dene our assumptions about the prinipals' states before the
protool begins, inluding whih terms they have aess to (using the sees syntax), and
whih beliefs they hold.
The rst premise expresses that B has the symmetri key whih enrypts M :
P1. B sees k
The following premise is neessary to derive G2. If B does not believe that it has
the seret key, k, then B annot believe it an perform deryption.
P2. B believes B sees k
3.1.4 Messages
This subsetion presents the assumptions about message reeption, omprehen-
sion, and interpretation.
3.1.4.1 Message Reeption.
As is standard in SVO analyses, we must assume the prinipals reeive the mes-
sages speied in the protool, or else we annot make any laims about the results of
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suh reeptions:
P3. C reeived fMg
k
P4. B reeived fMg
k
3.1.4.2 Message Comprehension.
Unlike the predeessor BAN logi, given in [8℄, SVO fores analysts to be ex-
pliit about whih elds in a message are omprehended by a reipient. Comprehended
elds must either ontain suÆient redundany or the reipient must have the proper
expetation of the eld value, in order for the reipient to at diretly on the ontents.
2
The request, a result of enryption, is opaque to C. Beause of this we assume
C omprehends the message to be an unreognized string, represented as the primitive

1
.
3
P5. C believes C reeived 
1
We also assume B annot diretly omprehend the payload (whih is enrypted),
but must assume its ontents to derypt it. In other words B knows it reeived an
opaque payload, but it must have other beliefs (given next) about that payload in order
to at upon it.
P6. B believes B reeived 
2
2
Note, a prinipal may still have expetations about the ontents of an unomprehended fragment
(suh as \this ontains an message enrypted with key k" or \this ontains a message intended for
another prinipal" or \this represents a none".). Suh expetations are given as separate interpretation
assumptions in SVO.
3
The primitives 
i
are reserved for this purpose in SVO. The subsript i allows representing distint
unreognized fragments.
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3.1.4.3 Message Interpretation.
Comprehension is the rst of two stages SVO introdues to redue the ambiguity
present in the BAN idealization proess. In this stage we assert how prinipals interpret
message fragments that are not omprehended. Speially we assume when B reeives
the opaque enrypted message, it interprets
4
that to be some message enrypted with
the seret key k:
P7. B believes (B reeived 
2
 B reeived fMg
k
)
3.1.4.4 Belief Conjugation.
If a prinipal holds two beliefs, it seems trivial to suppose it also holds a belief
about the onjugation of both objets of those beliefs. In symbols: (P believes ' ^
P believes  )  P believes (' ^  ). Surprisingly, SVO appears to lak suh an axiom,
so we expliitly assume a spei ase as a premise:
P8. (B believes B reeived fMg
k
^B believes B sees k) 
B believes (B reeived fMg
k
^B sees k)
3.1.5 Derivations
With the above assumptions, we derive the two goals of the olluders, A and B.
The rst two derivations reah G1 beause B reeived the enrypted message and had
the appropriate deryption key, and thus sees the message:
D1. B reeived M
MP of P4, P1 applied to Ax8.
D2. B sees M
MP of D1 applied to Ax10.
4
Without this assumed interpretation, B would have no justiation for derypting with key k.
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The next four derivations are more subtle, to reah the subtler goal, G2. First,
B believes B reeived an enrypted message beause it believed it reeived an inom-
prehensible message and it believed that to be interpreted as a message enrypted with
k:
D3. B believes B reeived fMg
k
MP of P6, P7 applied to Ax1.
Now, B believes deryption of the message fMg
k
yields the M . This belief is G2.
D4. B believes [(B reeived fMg
k
^B sees k)  B reeived M ℄
Ne. of Ax8
D5. B believes (B reeived fMg
k
^B sees k)
MP of D3, P2 applied to P8.
D6. B believes B reeived M
MP of D4, D5 applied to Ax1.
3.1.6 Summary
In this derivation we show that the olluders an transmit a banned message
through the rewall given two onditions: The reipient has the deryption key and
knows it, and more importantly, the rewall forwards the enrypted message.
The latter is not learly represented in the analysis, aside from the ad ho forward-
ing assumption stated in Setion 3.1.2. That assumption omplements our assumptions
fMg
k
2 A, but there is no diret relation between these assumptions. In the next
setion we propose denitions whih rigorously establish suh a relationship.
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3.2 The Computable Filter Poliy
We now introdue mehanisms within SVO to expliitly relate the forwarding
assumption of Setion 3.1.2 to our onept of the sets A and B. This rigorously re-
dues the problem to one of omputability, demonstrating the interfae between formal
methods and omputational soundness methods.
3.2.1 The Filter Funtion
Previously we onstrained the banned messages only by B  M
T
. Not only is
this vague but it omits onsideration of an important notion: How does C determine if
a message belongs to this set?
The rewall must have some omputable riterion by whih it hooses whih
messages to blok, whih we all the lter, F . The lter denes the rewall poliy
beause of the rewall's passive bloking onstraint.
The rewall onstraints given in Setion 1.2.2 imply the following lter properties:
Computability. The rewall ats by its passive onstraint aording to the
lter riterion, so F must be omputable.
Deidable. The lter must deide whih set A or B a message belongs to within
pragmati time bounds. This property onstrains the range of F to two outomes. We
use the term deidable to emphasize B must be a deidable language.
Stateless and Content-Based. The lter deision depends only on a single
input message, and no other ontext, due to message independene. This denes the
domain of F to the set of all possible messages, M
T
.
3.2.1.1 Domain and Range.
We introdue a set of lter deisions, denoted D, ontaining only two speial
primitives, Allowed and Banned. We require the lter to map all messages to a lter
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deision, so: F :M
T
7! D.
The banned set is now dened
5
in terms of the lter, B  fM : F(M) =
Bannedg. With this denition, we say a messageM passes the lter if F(M) = Allowed.
3.2.2 Generalized Message Obfusation
With a rened notion of the rewall poliy, we now generalize the message trans-
formations by whih the olluders an ahieve their goals. Intuitively, the sender trans-
lates a banned message to an allowed message. The allowed message is forwarded, and
the reipient (who must know the reverse transformation) an reover the original. In so
generalizing, we must relax an assumption implied by enryption; a generally obfusated
message may appear as another meaningful message, whereas an enrypted message is
always assumed to be opaque.
In the illustrative analysis of Setion 3.1, we assume fMg
k
2 A. However, nothing
requires this to be true, and we may just as well assume fMg
k
2 B, with aveats.
6
Instead of onsidering only the spei enryption message transformation, fMg
k
, we
generalize the message transformation, using the lter properties as a basis.
3.2.2.1 Computations to Obsure and Reveal.
We assume bothM
T
and B are ountably innite, and therefore ountably innite
omputable one-to-one mappings between them exist, whih we all obfusation trans-
formations. Let an obfusation funtion, G :M
T
7! A, denote one suh mapping from
all messages to only allowed messages, and let the orresponding revelation funtion,
G
 1
, be its inverse. For any message M we have G(M) 2 A and also G
 1
(G(M)) =M ,
both by denition.
Mapping Agreement. The goal of the olluders an be ahieved by using any
suh pair of transformations. However, they must agree on whih spei transformation
5
The allowed set is dened in the analogous manner.
6
There is an important aveat related to omputability here, whih we address in Setion 4.2.
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to employ. We assume a unique one-to-one mapping from the natural numbers to eah
obfusation transformation pair is available to the olluders.
We denote the j-th suh obfusation funtion as G
j
and the orresponding reve-
lation funtion as G
 1
j
. The olluders an agree on whih pair of transformations to use
by agreeing on an index j. We also require a prinipal to know j in order to ompute
G
j
or G
 1
j
.
7
Comparison to Symmetri Enryption. Although the properties of these
transformations are purposefully similar to those of symmetri enryption, there are
important dierenes. The obfusation transformations are dened in terms of the
lter funtion. If the lter funtion is quite simple, then so might the obfusation
transformations (so they may be vulnerable to even simple ryptanalysis).
Another important distintion is that an obfusated message may appear as an-
other meaningful message, whereas typially symmetrially enrypted messages are as-
sumed to be opaque. This important distintion is disussed below in Setion 3.3.5.2
when onsidering message omprehension.
To further larify, if the iphertext is allowed, fMg
k
2 A, then symmetri en-
ryption transformations are a subset of the obfusation transformations.
3.3 Rened Analysis
The denitions of the omputable lter and obfusation transformations pave the
way for the following rened analysis.
3.3.1 Goals
We derive the same goals as in the illustrative analysis.
G1. B sees M
7
For the purposes of SVO, we onsider G
j
(M) to be a funtion of both M and j.
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G2. B believes B sees M
3.3.2 Protool
The protool losely resembles that of the illustrative analysis in Setion 3.1, ex-
ept we have replaed the notation for standard enryption with an obfusation funtion
on M . This still arries the impliit assumption, due to M2, that the rewall does not
blok the message. However, in this analysis we derive that the rewall sends M2 rather
than merely assuming it.
M1. A! C : G
j
(M)
M2. C ! B : G
j
(M)
3.3.3 Filter-Related Premises
Before presenting protool related premises, we present three premises related to
the lter and obfusation.
3.3.3.1 Filter Deisions.
Reall that lter deision primitives are treated speially in that we assume the
rewall does not begin the protool run with aess to them. This onstraint makes the
lter funtion the only hannel by whih the rewall an gain aess to these deisions.
This gives us our rst premise
8
with regards to the lter funtion. By denition
F(G
j
(M)) = Allowed, so seeing either implies seeing the other. If C sees the lter
results of an obfusated message, C sees the Allowed deision.
P1. C sees F(G
j
(M))  C sees Allowed
8
This premise may not be logially neessary, but we inlude it to make the derivation semantis
more expliit.
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3.3.3.2 Firewall Poliy.
In the illustrative analysis, we merely assumed the rewall forwards the request
due to the omplementary interpretation assumption that the rewall does not believe
the enrypted request to ontain a banned message.
However, with our onept of lter deisions dened, we an now express the
rewall poliy as a premise. If the rewall sees a message, and sees the Allowed lter
deision, then the rewall sends the message.
P2. [(C sees G
j
(M)) ^ (C sees Allowed)℄  C says G
j
(M)
3.3.3.3 Implied Routing.
Beause SVO is intended for protools with small nite numbers of partiipants,
it laks message syntax for routing. In the simplied network topography of the CFP,
we are safe to assume anything C says is reeived by B.
P3. C says G
j
(M)  B reeived G
j
(M)
3.3.4 Initial State
The olluder goals G1 & G2 do not require prevention of eavesdropping, beause
the rewall is onstrained by the Passive Bloking poliy. Therefore, the transforma-
tion index, j, need not be seret. The olluders only need to agree on an obfusation
transformation pair.
9
P4. B sees j
We also require B to have a belief in seeing j to derive G2, in an analogous
manner to the illustrative analysis.
P5. B believes B sees j
9
We omit statements about A agreeing on j whih is impliit in M1.
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3.3.5 Messages
Message reeption, omprehension, and interpretation is greatly hanged from
the illustrative analysis. These dierenes demonstrate the eets of our lter funtion
mehanism.
3.3.5.1 Message Reeption.
We only take message reeption of the rst message as a premise. Reeption of
the seond message follows from the lter deision, rewall poliy, and implied routing.
P6. C reeived G
j
(M)
3.3.5.2 Message Comprehension.
The premises about omprehension diverge greatly from the illustrative analysis
and standard SVO omprehension premises. The reason is that obfusation and revela-
tion transform one valid message into another (whih need not be an opaque primitive,

i
). The prinipals will omprehend a transformed message as it appears. There is no
way to determine whether it is an obfusation result by omprehension.
In the illustrative analysis, opaque messages were omprehended as 
i
primitives.
There is nothing to prevent the obfusation transformation from mapping to a message
other than a 
i
primitive. We onsider this a more general view of omprehension, but
there may be semanti aveats.
10
For these premises, we let G
j
(M) = Y , where Y 2 A is any valid message
(inluding both 
i
and other messages).
P7. C believes C reeived Y
10
At this time we are unertain about the soundness impliations of generalizing omprehension in
this way.
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As mentioned under Message Reeption, we hoose to derive the transmission of
M2, rather than assume it as a premise. This also means we must derive B's ompre-
hension of the message from its reeption, rather than assume it. To aomplish this,
we take as a premise that if B reeives the forward, B omprehends it as message Y .
P8. (B reeived G
j
(M))  (B believes B reeived Y )
3.3.5.3 Message Interpretation.
In traditional SVO message interpretation, premises are presented in whih a
prinipal interprets an opaque primitive, 
i
, as another message. We allow more general
interpretation in keeping with our more general omprehension mehanism.
The rewall omprehends the request as Y , and has no other interpretation of
this. On the other hand, B interprets messages to represent something other than
it omprehends them to be. This is a key ingredient in our onept of ollusion and
obfusation. When B reeives a message it interprets that to be an obfusation of a
dierent message, regardless of how it is omprehended. So we have:
P9. B believes (B reeived Y  B reeived G
j
(M))
3.3.5.4 Belief Conjugation.
We again enounter the problem of belief onjugation mentioned in the illustrative
analysis of Setion 3.1. We solve it with the same approah, by taking as a premise a
spei instane
11
of what we onsider should be axiomati
12
.
P9. (B believes B sees G
j
(M) ^B believes B sees j) 
B believes (B sees G
j
(M) ^B sees j)
11
Notie how similar the two instanes are: they both deal with beliefs about transformed messages
and the appropriate parameter for the reverse transformation (whether enryption in the illustrative
derivation, or obfusation in this derivation).
12
The axiom shemata we propose is (P believes ' ^ P believes  )  P believes (' ^  )
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3.3.6 Derivations
With our rened premises laid out, we proeed with the derivation to reah the
olluder goals G1 & G2 . In the rst stage we prove the rewall forwards the request.
3.3.6.1 Passing the Filter.
We derive that the request passes the lter beause C sees the request, and an
apply the lter to see the result, whih is Allowed.
D1. C sees G
j
(M)
MP of P6 applied to Ax10.
D2. C sees F(G
j
(M))
MP of D1 applied to Ax12.
D3. C sees Allowed
MP of D2 applied to P1.
3.3.6.2 Forwarding the Request.
The message passes the lter and gets forwarded by the poliy premise, P3. The
forward is reeived by B aording to the implied routing premise, P4.
D4. C says G
j
(M)
MP of D1, D3 applied to P2.
D5. B reeived G
j
(M)
MP of D4 applied to P3.
3.3.6.3 Revelation.
When B reeives the forward and performs the appropriate revelation transfor-
mation, B ahieves G1.
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Reeiving implies B has aess to the revealed message via transformation. Here
we onsider G
 1
to be a funtion of the index, j, and the obfusated message, G
j
(M).
The revealed message is just M and seeing the former is seeing the latter, by P2.
D6. B sees M
MP of D5 applied to Ax10.
3.3.6.4 Comprehension and Interpretation.
In reeiving the forward, B omprehends it to be Y (as disussed above), and in
turn interprets it to be the obfusated message, G
j
(M). This interpretation is at the
heart of the ollusion we model in this report.
D7. B believes B reeived Y
MP of D5 applied to P8.
D8. B believes B reeived G
j
(M)
MP of D7, P9 applied to Ax1.
3.3.6.5 Belief in the Revelation.
By Neessitation, B believes it sees the message interpretation:
D9. B believes (B reeived G
j
(M)  B sees G
j
(M))
Ne. of Ax10
D10. B believes B sees G
j
(M)
MP of D8, D9 applied to Ax1.
Furthermore, B believes that if it sees an obfusated message, G
j
(M), and the
appropriate revelation parameter, j, then it an reover the message. (This omes also
by Neessitation.)
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D11. B believes [(B sees G
j
(M) ^B sees j)  B sees M ℄
Ne. of Ax12
Finally, by the belief onjuntion premise, B believes it an reveal the message
M .
D12. B believes B sees G
j
(M) ^B sees j
MP of D10, P5 applied to P10.
D13. B believes B sees M
MP of D11, D12 applied to Ax1.
3.3.7 Summary
We apply the onept of the lter funtion and the obfusation transformations
to rene our analysis of the CFP.
The deision, poliy, and routing premises allow us to derive the transmission
of the forward, M2, rather than assume it. These premises are somewhat unwieldy
beause they require speial treatment of the deision primitives, D. More importantly,
a areful reader will notie the onit in verb tense in the routing premise, P3. This
may represent a semanti aw in our approah.
The obfusation funtions may transform messages into other non-opaque mes-
sages, and this may have soundness impliations of whih we are not aware. The avor
of interpretation is altered by this obfusation property (whih we reet by using the
symbol Y rather than 
i
). We believe this emphasizes an important dierene in om-
prehension and interpretation: the former may be thought of as an algorithmi proess
suh as parsing, the latter aptures assumptions of the intent of the parties involved.
This onludes our hapter on analysis, and we proeed next to overview open
topis for further researh.
Chapter 4
Further Work
Muh remains open in understanding the CFP, and the relationship between
protool analysis logis and omputability. This setion is an overview of open topis.
4.1 Gaps in Analysis
The most ritial path for future researh is to address potential gaps in our
analysis, whih we review here:
4.1.1 Soundness
Some of our deviations from standard SVO analyses may rely on impliit devia-
tions to the semantis of SVO. Those semanti deviations may aet the soundness of
the hanged logi. Those deviations are as follows.
4.1.1.1 Comprehending Obfusated Messages.
Perhaps the most signiant hange we introdue is transformations between
meaningful, omprehensible messages. In standard SVO, transformations suh as fMg
k
do not result in \ollisions of omprehension". In other words, no prinipal will mistak-
enly omprehend fMg
k
as Y . Instead they will always omprehend suh transformations
as opaque fragments, 
i
.
31
If we allow omprehension of fMg
k
as a dierent message Y , then what pre-
vents omprehending any unreognized fragment as another message? Perhaps a more
poignant example of this onern is omprehending a none, N
i
, as a valid message, X.
In every SVO example we've seen, message transformations yield unique messages,
and unreognized fragments are always omprehended as opaque 
i
primitives. We
deviate from this pratie.
4.1.1.2 Implied Routing Premise.
In Setion 3.3.3 we assume a premise of the form C says G
j
(M)  B reeived G
j
(M).
The verb tense of these onnetives do not agree, and this may indiate an unexpeted
semanti result. If that result is not the intuitive one we attempt to express, then
hanging the semantis to t our intuition may break soundness (or other important
semanti results).
4.2 Open Computational Issues
4.2.1 Rigorously Dened Filter Funtions
We introdue the dening harateristis of lter funtions in Setion 3.2.1, but
neglet to go into more detail. This glosses over entire elds of literature on parsing,
pattern reognition, intrusion detetion, steganography, and ryptanalysis, to name a
few.
Of partiular interest is a ryptanalyti question: Can the set of banned messages
pratially inlude enryptions of a ore set of banned messages. In the illustrative
analysis of Setion 3.1 we assumed fMg
k
2 A. Suppose we wish to make the inverse
assumption, fMg
k
2 B. Can we dene a lter that detets F(fMg
k
) = Banned given
that M 2 B but k is unknown?
The answer to this question probably has many appliations, but as we show
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in the ase of the CFP obfusation transformations exist as long as the lter meets
the speied onstraints. Even if fMg
k
2 B, we an obfusate it to another allowed
message.
4.2.2 Obfusation Based on Partial Information
We assume the obfusation transformations were dened in terms of the lter.
But if the olluders only have partial information about F , an they still agree on
obfusations that provably reah their goals?
If omputational onstraints further than we have speied an be proved for F ,
then perhaps there are obfusations whih would work against any pratial lter. This
is perhaps a goal of ryptanalysis: Given an enryption (aka obfusation) funtion,
is it possible to determine whether a bitstring is within its range with only partial
information about the plaintext or key?
4.3 Broadening the CFP Denition
Eah of the rewall onstraints in Setion 1.2.2 ould be relaxed in a searh for
more general results. We review eah onstraint and disuss the eets of relaxing it.
4.3.1 Passive Bloking.
A rewall whih an spontaneously generate messages might launh \attaks"
aimed at exposing two olluders.
For example, imagine the olluders are partiipating in an embedded protool de-
ned by a sequene of messages M
i
, all of whih are banned. A obfusates an embedded
protool message, M
1
, then sends it aross the rewall. B reeives the obfusated
message, reveals it, and generates M
2
aording to the embedded protool. Then B
obfusates M
2
and sends it bak. This ontinues to the ompletion of a protool.
In this senario an rewall whih is not onstrained to passive bloking might try
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things like replaying obfusated messages to learn more about the obfusation trans-
formation. For example, if the embedded protool exhanges information about the
obfusation transformation, then this problem begins to look muh like one of authen-
tiation in the fae of an ative intruder.
4.3.2 Message Independene.
As briey mentioned in the last senario, a rewall may try to reord relationships
between dierent requests to learn more information about the olluders.
4.3.3 Content-Based Filtering.
A rewall may also blok messages based on route. Analyzing this would require
allowing ompliated network topologies. Colluders ould attempt to bypass route-based
ltering by forwarding messages around unbloked lients.
4.4 Synthesizing SVO and GS
Both analyses with SVO in Chapter 3 reveal ertain limitations in appliation to
the CFP. The GS logi, mentioned in Setion 2.1.2, addresses these issues, but it does
not address arbitrary omputations whih are essential to our results. The features of
GS not found in SVO are that it addresses protools whih are open-ended both in
partiipant topology and branhing.
4.4.1 Open-Ended Partiipant Topology
GS an analyze protools with an open-ended number of partiipants related by
dierent topologies. This would allow broadening the CFP speiation to inlude
route-based ensorship and ollusion strategies.
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4.4.2 Branhing Protools
We attempt to model a branhing protool in SVO, but our analysis is somewhat
unwieldy. The GS logi addresses this issue by a knowledge program onept. A knowl-
edge program denes how a prinipal reats to reeiving a message, whih may inlude
sending a new message. Axioms then support the notion that if a prinipal in a given
state is running a given knowledge program and reeives a given messages, then it sends
another message. This is preisely what we wish to apture
Chapter 5
Conlusion
We introdue and dene the CFP, then give two analyses in the SVO in searh of
solutions. The rst analysis is illustrative of the drawbaks of SVO in addressing this
problem. We introdue and dene the omputable lter funtion and related obfusa-
tion transformations whih address these drawbaks. Our seond analysis applies these
onepts to demonstrate their utility.
Our ontribution shows how SVO (a formal view) when applied to the CFP
redues to a problem of omputability, highlighting the interfae between the formal
method and omputational soundness perspetives.
In doing so we show how olluders may always bypass message-based ensorship
if they agree on an obfusation mapping derived from the rewall poliy.
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